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ARTICLES




As a Cambridge magistrate in the England of 1960, Lady
Rothschild doubtless considered herself an unlikely candidate
for participation in a biblical drama reenactment. Nonetheless,
on October 21, 1960,' she willingly played the role of the last-
minute angel of mercy in a virtual reenactment of the story of
Abraham and Isaa 2 -a story which, with unfortunate varia-
tions in the outcome for the child, seems destined to be repeat-
ed frequently in the future.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable aid of his research
assistant, Edward Francis Kelly, J.D., MAL, and Ph.D. Candidate, University of
Virginia, 1992-93.
** Henry J. Abraham is the James Hart Professor of Government and Foreign
Affairs at the University of Virginia.
1. Court Edict Saves British Baby's Life; Parents Overruled, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22,
1960, at 25 [hereinafter Court Edict]. See also Henry J. Abraham, Religion, Medicine,
and the State: Reflections on Some Contemporary Issues, 22 J. CHURCH & ST. 423
(1980).
2. Genesis 22: 1-14. Obedient but not understanding why the life of his only son
Isaac should be forfeited, Abraham was at the point of sacrificing his son when an
angel of the Lord called out to him and stayed his hand. The Lord rewarded
Abraham's faith and did not require the sacrifice of his son. See id.
951
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
On the occasion in question here, a day-old boy in a Cam-
bridge hospital was at the point of death or at least severe
brain damage.3 Doctors had concluded that only an immediate
and complete change of blood would save him. However, the
child's parents were devout Jehovah's Witnesses and refused to
consent to a blood transfusion because their religious beliefs
forbade it. 4
Apprised of the crisis by a county welfare officer, Lady
Rothschild immediately convened an emergency court at the
hospital, compelling the baby's father to appear promptly before
the court. He continued to refuse to consent to the treatment,
explaining, "[m]y wife and I are dedicated servants of God, and
the decisions we are making are on His word. If we take a
course of action which might prolong life now, everlasting life
will be cut off."5 Undeterred, Lady Rothschild inquired whether
the father would take the child into his home if she ordered the
transfusion. When the father confessed his love for the child,
and answered in the affirmative, Magistrate Rothschild imme-
diately committed the baby into the temporary care of the wel-
fare officer.' The officer provided the necessary legal consent
and the transfusion operation commenced a few minutes later.
Within twenty-four hours, the child was out of danger and legal
custody was returned to the parents.7
The above scenario is as old as Genesis, but the outcome is
not always as happy as the angel of the Lord and Lady Roths-
child were able to make it. This article will examine those
modern occasions on which the law is called upon to intervene
in a family's decisionmaking process, or to sit in judgment of
that process after-the-fact, when faith, medicine, and the law
collide.
3. Court Edict, supra note 1, at 25.
4. Id. Jehovah's Witnesses interpret passages from Leviticus and the Acts of the
Apostles as forbidding blood transfusions. Acts 15:20 ("abstain . . . from blood"); Levit-
icus 17:10 ("any man . . . who eats any sort of blood, I shall certainly set my face
against . . . and I shall indeed cut him off from among his people"). See Washington
v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 502 n.8 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
5. Abraham, supra note 1, at 435; Court Edict supra note 1, at 25.
6. Court Edict, supra note 1, at 25.
7. Id.
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11.. PARAMETERS OF THE DECISIONMAIUNG PROBLEM
The clash between medical indications and personal
decisionmaking presents a variety of unresolved legal issues
that could not have been foreseen by our political and judicial
forbears. In an age of advancing medical technology, each gen-
eration is presented with new questions and hard choices, and
sometimes the old principles clash with one another instead of
providing answers.
One time-honored value, which still provides some guidance,
is personal self-determination. The Supreme Court expressed
this principle in 1891, stating that every individual is entitled
to "possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint or interference from others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law."8 Thus, in the situation where a com-
petent adult refuses to undergo "necessary" medical treatment,
the legal difficulties are almost always resolved in favor of the
adult's freedom to decide for himself. This includes the situa-
tion where a fully conscious and competent adult requests with-
drawal of life-sustaining .treatment. 9 Whatever the gravity of
the consequences to his own person, courts have nearly always
deferred to a competent individual's right to decide his destiny
unencumbered by the state.'0
8. Union Pac. R.R. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
9. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp 1452, 1455
n.8 (D.C. 1985) (noting that society's concern in prevention of suicide is not involved
when permission is being sought, not to terminate a healthy life by artificial, self-
induced means, but merely to allow nature to take its course).
10. Commentator Ivy B. Dodes has cited four state-court cases to this effect, includ-
ing In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1985), in which the court held that the
state's interest in keeping a murder witness alive to testify at trial did not override
the individual's right to refuse a blood transfusion consistent with the free exercise of
his faith as a Jehovah's Witness. Ivy B. Dodes, Note, 'Suffer the Little Children..
Toward a Judicial Recognition of a Duty of Reasonable Care Owed Children By Faith
Healers, 16 HoFsTRA L. REV. 165, 184 n.107 (1987).
But a problem arises, in the case of an adult, when there is a question as to
whether the person is in fact "competent" and able to appreciate the consequences of
the choice at hand. But see Court Rejects Pleas of Woman Facing Amputation of Feet,
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1978 (reporting a 72-year-old woman stricken with gangrene
objects to the amputation of her feet). The woman was declared incompetent to decide
in State Dep't of Human Services v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
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The competent adult thus presents a relatively easy case.
However, those cases where an adult patient is not competent
to decide because of severe injury or illness present special
problems. The courts instinctively resort to the principle of self-
determination even in these cases, and try to ascertain what
the will of the patient was or would have been in the situation
presented. But the principle is often of little use where the self
is no longer in a position to determine anything. Instead, the
question of surrogate decisionmaking arises, with all its predict-
able complications.
In these vexing cases, the need for live-saving medical treat-
ment is generally taken for granted at the onset of the patient's
calamity. However, when the patient neither recovers nor dies,
falling into a persistent vegetative state without hope of recov-
ery, the decisionmaking about whether to withdraw the life-
sustaining medical treatment falls to others, who must reluc-
tantly accept the burden. In this most difficult area, the courts
still make a sometimes desperate effort to determine what the
clear will of the patient was before the onset of the debilitating
condition. If, as often happens, the patient's prior wishes are
unclear, there simply is no easy solution. Courts have groped
for an acceptable answer to this problem with only limited
success. Families, hospitals, and the public have incurred great
expense while the riddles of artificially sustained life are imper-
fectly sorted out." Legislators, for their part, have begun to
provide a partial answer in the form of living will legislation
that is now on the books in one form or another in at least
forty-one states. 12
These illustrative clashes among the will of a patient, the
desires of the patient's family, the patient's medical prognosis,
and the interests of the state, are complex enough. However,
the mixture of rights and interests involving life and death
becomes even more complex when the inscrutable element of
religious belief becomes part of the equation. Thus, when a
11. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dep't, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
12. See Henry R. Glick, The Right-to-Die: State Policymaking and the Elderly, 5 J.
AGING STUDIES 283, 289 (1991).
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minor is too young to decide for himself, and his parents have
decided against medical treatment for religious reasons, then
society is presented with a problem both vexing and potentially
tragic. For we must respect the free exercise of religion, as well
as protect our minor citizens from abuse and neglect. When
these duties clash, the state, in its role of parens patriae,is is
sometimes called upon to pass judgment over the religious prac-
tices of competent adults, and a great clash ensues between
individual religious freedom and the duties of the state with
regard to minor citizens. In the struggle to come to terms with
this conflict between free exercise of religion on the one hand,
and our perception of medical reality on the other, the law has
not altogether succeeded.
The law is fairly clear with respect to at least one aspect of
this clash. Where parents have refused to consent to life-saving
medical treatment for their minor child based on religious be-
liefs, and when there is still time to intervene to save the life
of the child, the courts of both England and the United States
have not hesitated to protect the child first. As Lady Rothschild
commented, whatever other rights or interests there may be,
"the responsibility to protect the life of the child is ours."'4
Thus, where circumstances have permitted, courts have con-
sistently intervened to protect children's lives and health by
assigning temporary legal custody of the child to an organ of
the state, and by consenting to the appropriate medical treat-
ment. 5 The governing principles in this area have developed
over many decades in the state courts of this country, particu-
larly in cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses, and the order-
ing of needed blood transfusions.
16
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) ("Parens patriae,' literally 'parent
of the country,' refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of per-
sons under legal disability . . . It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those
quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people ... )
(citations omitted).
14. Abraham, supra note 1, at 436.
15. The "legal custody" concept is well-suited to this purpose, for it allows the par-
ents to retain physical custody of the child-with all the attendant benefits to every-
one involved-while temporarily assigning to the state the right to decide questions of
medical treatment. See Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical
Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 158 n.8 (1983).
16. Id. at 162 n.22 (citing a number of cases to this effect, including People ex rel.
1993] 955
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Our highest court first articulated these principles-and elo-
quently so-in a case not involving medical treatment at all.
The case was Prince v. Massachusetts," decided in 1944. This
case presented the question of whether the child labor laws
applied to an aunt who was the legal guardian of her nine-
year-old niece, and who claimed an exemption from the laws on
religious grounds. The aunt, a Jehovah's Witness, was brought
into court for employing her nine-year-old niece to distribute
the Watchtower and Consolation Magazines on public streets.
The Court held that the aunt was not entitled to an exemption
from the protective child labor laws on account of her reli-
gion. 8 The Court's decision was by an 8-1 vote with a concur-
ring opinion from Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, and with
Justice Murphy in dissent. Justice Rutledge, speaking for the
Court, stated:
[NIeither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are
beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in
youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict
the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulat-
ing or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other
ways .... The right to practice religion does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communica-
ble disease or the latter to ill health or death. 9
The Court concluded: "Parents may be free to become mar-
tyrs themselves. But it does not follow [that] they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children be-
fore they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
they can make that choice for themselves." °
Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d
751 (N.J. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Santos v. Goldstein, 16 A-D.2d 755,
227 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), appeal dismissed, 232 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1962);
In re Brooklyn Hosp., 258 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d
128 (Ohio C.P. Lucas 1962); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)).
17. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
18. Id. at 161-62.
19. Id. at 166-67 (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903)).
20. Id. at 170.
956 [Vol. 27:951
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The Court's language here was limited to the facts of the
case, and so might have remained non-binding dicta, if not for
a rare federal case directly on point which arose more than
twenty years later in 1967. Jehovah's Witnesses in the State of
Washington v. King County Hospital2 involved a class action
challenge to the constitutionality of Washington's Juvenile
Court Act by the 8,900 Jehovah's Witnesses in the state.
Under the Juvenile Court Act, whenever it appeared that the
child of Jehovah's Witnesses could possibly need a blood trans-
fusion in the course of medical treatment and the parents re-
fused to consent, the attending physician or the hospital would
petition the state courts for removal of the child from the legal
custody of the parents pending the medical treatment. The
courts of the state generally granted these petitions, made the
children wards of the court for the period medically necessary,
and consented to the transfusions over the religious objections
of the parents.22 The parents' constitutional challenge in the
King County Hospital case claimed that this practice, and the
underlying statute, violated the First Amendment's free exercise
clause, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
A special three-judge federal district court was convened to
hear the case.23 It found no difficulty in affirming the constitu-
tionality of Washington's Juvenile Court statute. Possibly con-
sidering itself bound by the Supreme Court's language in
Prince, and persuaded by the analysis of several state court
cases on the same subject, the three-judge court concluded that
the statute must stand, notwithstanding the plaintiff's religious
objections.2
Naturally dissatisfied with this judgment, the plaintiff Jeho-
vah's Witnesses appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which then resolved the issue with crystal clarity, per curiam,
and without comment. The opinion in the case stated, in its
21. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
22. Id. at 491.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 505.
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entirety: "The judgment is affirmed, Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158."25
Thus, the ability of a state to exercise its responsibility as
parens patriae, and to intervene in a family's decisionmaking
process where a child's life is at stake, is clear, regardless of
the parents' religious convictions. An apparently unbroken line
of state court decisions had upheld this principle even before
the Jehovah's Witnesses challenged Washington's juvenile court
laws in the federal courts.
26
In fact, even where the danger to the child falls short of a
life-threatening situation, but threatens the child's continued
health and development, courts have frequently held that the
state may intervene, largely under the principles developed by
state common law and enunciated in Prince v. Massachusetts.
The standards for such intervention are of course, not as easily
articulated as they are when a child's life is at stake. However,
the sensible thrust of this line of cases is that the state will
intervene when the child's life, limb, health, or future is at
stake.27
This is perhaps as it should be. In many of these cases, as in
the case adroitly resolved by Magistrate Rothschild in 1960, all
the parties win: the state, because it has successfully exercised
its responsibility to protect the lives of its minor citizens; the
child, because the child lives and has perhaps better prospects
for future health; and the parents, both because the child is
alive and well, and because in most cases they have not violat-
ed their conscience by choosing the sin of medical treatment.28
Instead, the "sin" falls upon the state, which accepts it willing-
ly. Moreover, the child himself may be regarded as blameless.
Of course, the religious beliefs of the parents and the inter-
ference with their decisionmaking in some cases render their
satisfaction less than complete, especially if they should feel
morally or spiritually tainted even by unavoidable subjection to
court order. But, unless the state is to adopt the religious
25. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
26. See supra note 16.
27. See Sher, supra note 15, at 162-65.
28. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 436.
[Vol. 27:951
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beliefs of a faith-healing denomination or abandon its role as
parens patriae altogether, this cannot be helped. On the whole,
a more desirable legal result for all parties involved can hardly
be conceived than that executed by Lady Rothschild, standing
in, as it were, for the angel of the Lord.29
However, these clashes between the state, the religious be-
liefs of a child's parents, and brute physical and medical reality
become even more vexatious and tragic in those cases where
intervention has not been timely. In these cases, tragedy has
already ensued. No amount of legal intervention can now save
the child's life. No careful balancing of interests can now satisfy
the State's obligations as parens patriae. Nothing can restore
the status quo ante. Here, the parents' defense of free exercise
of religion frequently evokes much sympathy. Moreover, the
sympathy thus evoked has deterred many a court and
prosecutor from the proceeding, despite what sometimes has
apparently been the easily avoidable death of a child.3"
Some argue that these tragic cases carry their own punish-
ment. They insist that prosecution for child neglect or man-
slaughter under these circumstances simply adds unnecessary
insult to tragic injury. The parents, the argument goes, did not
neglect the child per se, but cared for the child in the way they
thought best. Further, having just suffered the grievous loss of
a child, parents should not be required to suffer further punish-
ment at the hands of the state for simply practicing their reli-
gious beliefs.3 ' Needless to say, others disagree strongly; some
go as far as to urge prosecution for murder.32
What then is the state's proper response in the heart-wrench-
ing situation where parents, acting upon sincere religious
29. Id.
30. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 432 (citing 100 A.L.R. 2d 483, 514-15 (1965)).
31. See, e.g., Shelli D. Robinson, Comment, Who Owns the Child?, 7 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 413 (1991) ("Whether parents choose to forego conventional medi-
cal treatment for either religious or non-religious reasons, their wishes should be hon-
ored .... Sometimes parents make the wrong choice. When that happens, no one
[sic] suffers more than the parents themselves.").
32. See, e.g., Judith I. Scheiderer, Note, When Children Die as a Result of Religious
Practices, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1429, 1445 (1990) (suggesting that the state should prose-
cute for murder rather than manslaughter).
1993] 959 .
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beliefs, have refused life-saving medical treatment resulting in
the death of their child?
Unfortunately, the law as it stands on this point is rather
confused and inconsistent. Neat resolution is complicated by the
natural human sympathies for both the children who have died
and for the parents who mourn them. Legislators, too, are re-
luctant to inject themselves into this delicate decisionmaking
process or to pass judgment upon its results. Consequently, the
federal government and the states have stepped only gingerly
into this area in an attempt to provide some protection for both
the children and the parents. Ironically, however, such legisla-
tion has often complicated rather than clarified the issue. Al-
though this tragic line of cases and statutes has a history
stretching back at least to the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the results have been repeatedly unsatisfactory and
inconsistent, and courts and juries still struggle for a solution.
III. REGULATING FAITH: SOME EARLY HISTORY33
The first attempts of the English courts and Parliament to
respond to four faith-healing cases during the latter part of the
nineteenth century illustrate the difficulties that have attended
this area of the law ever since advances in medical care began
to provide arguably dependable remedies for grievous illness-
es.34 It seems that an English sect known as "The Peculiar
People" believed that the use of medical care showed a lack of
33. Evidently, religion and medicine have long been uneasy bedfellows in the
Western world. See People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (reporting that for a
thousand years it was considered dishonest in the West to practice physics or sur-
gery). The Church's Lateran Council of the thirteenth century forbade physicians to
practice their arts except in the presence of a priest, and the proscription was
eventually enforced by excommunication. Id. at 245, noted in Daniel J. Kearney,
Comment, Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on
Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death, 90 DicK L. REv. 861, 873 (1986). Given the
state of the medical arts at the time, these suspicions may well have been justified.
34. See Scheiderer, supra note 32, at 1429-31; Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the
Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious
Belief and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319 (1991); see
also Robert L. Trescher & Thomas N. O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent Children:
Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 206-07
(1960).
960 [Vol. 27:951
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faith in Gfod" In each of the four principal cases involving the
Peculiar People which arrived in the English courts, a minor
child had died after the parents declined to seek medical assis-
tance for the child's illness, and criminal charges were brought
against the parents. The results were mixed.
In 1868, the judge in Regina v. Wagstaffe36 left the issue to
the jury to decide whether the actions of the parents, based on
their sincere religious beliefs, were negligent under the circum-
stances. The jury acquitted. The case attracted the attention of
Parliament, however, and the Mother of Parliaments immedi-
ately passed an amendment to the Poor Laws to prevent simi-
lar tragedies in the future. The amendment required that par-
ents or legal guardians provide medical care for children with
serious illness, on pain of misdemeanor for willful neglect.3 7
Nevertheless, six years after the 1868 Poor Law amendment
was passed, a two-year-old child among the Peculiar People
died of pneumonia while the parents prayed; yet the trial judge,
not mentioning the statute, directed a verdict of not guilty.
Evidently, the judge simply took a dim view of contemporary
medical practice, and did not find the requisite causal relation-
ship between failure to provide medical care and the child's
death from pneumonia. He therefore found no failure of duty in
the parents' decision to resort to nursing and prayers instead of
"calling in a doctor to apply blisters, leeches, and calo-
mel.... .3  Subsequent cases in England were far more stern,
and expressed more confidence in the medical profession by
finding guilt even where the alleged neglect was based on a
mistaken judgment that medical assistance was not needed,
35. See Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868).
36. Id.
37. The amendment stated in part that "[wihen any parent shall willfully neglect
to provide adequate food, Clothing, Medical Aid, or Lodging for his Child . . . where-
by the Health of such Child shall have been. . . injured, he shall be guilty of an
offence .... ." Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodations and Criminal Liability,
17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 559, 562 (1990) (quoting Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868, 31
& 32 Vict., ch. 22, § 37). This was evidently the first statute of its kind in England
or the United States to impose a duty of medical care upon a parent or guardian. Id.
38. Regina v. Hines, 33 L.T.R. 675, 676 (1878); noted in Regina v. Downes, 1 L.R.-
Q.B. 25 (1875).
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and where the responsible parent believed that it was wrong to
call for medical aid.39
Like the early English cases, early American cases portrayed
a certain ambivalence about criminal liability for reliance upon
faith-healing. In State v. Sandford,4" for example, the defen-
dant, the leader of a close-knit religious community, was
charged with manslaughter in connection with the death of a
fifteen-year-old boy by illness and starvation, partly as a result
of a religious fast. The defendant was convicted after a jury tri-
al, but the conviction was overturned on appeal. It appeared to
the appellate court that the jury instructions had left open the
impermissible possibility that the verdict turned on the ques-
tion of whether the jury thought faith-healing was effica-
cious.4' Thus, the defendant's manslaughter conviction was
overturned.
In contrast, the early case of People v. Pierson" involved a
charge under a statute specifically creating misdemeanor liabili-
ty for failure to provide needed medical care for children. The
judge instructed the jury that a religious belief in the efficacy
of faith-healing and the inefficacy of medicine was not a legal
excuse for failure to comply with the statute.43 Detecting no
excuse, the jury found the defendant guilty. The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the fol-
lowing jury instruction was not erroneous:
Ulf at the time [the defendant] refused to call a physician,
he knew the child to be dangerously ill, his belief consti-
tutes no defense whatever to the charge made. In other
words, no man can be permitted to set up his religious
belief as a defense to the commission of an act which is in
plain violation of the law of the state."
These essentially inconsistent early English and American
cases and statutes illustrate the legal community's historically
39. Regina v. Downes, 1 L.R.-Q.B. 25 (1875).
40. 59 A. 597 (Me. 1905).
41. Id.
42. 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 244.
962 [Vol. 27:951
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equivocal response to this clash of law, faith, and medicine.
Courts and legislators in the United States have continued
their ambivalence in the face of this difficult issue to this day.
In fact, in a talk I gave thirteen years ago, I was able to say
that there apparently exists "no appellate case of record uphold-
ing the conviction of a parent or'guardian on homicide charges
where religious belief was presented as a defense."45 While
there had been convictions for misdemeanors, the cases involv-
ing one degree or another of homicide46 had all been over-
turned on appeal for one reason or another.4 In light of this
fact, I have not been alone in suggesting that courts of appeal
have been very creative in finding ways to overturn these ver-
dicts because of sympathy for the bereaved parents.48 Today,
however, the courts have rounded this corner. This may be
because there is less sympathy for religious practice, more con-
fidence in medicine or because courts have begun to lose pa-
tience with the apparently avoidable loss of life. In any event,
no longer can it be said that no homicide convictions have been
upheld upon appeal.49
45. Abraham, supra note 1, at 432 (citing Catherine W. Laughran, Religious Beliefs
and the Criminal Justice System: Some Problems of the Faith Healer, 8 LOY. L. REV.
396, 407 n.48 (1975)).
46. "Homicide," the killing of one human being by the act, inducement, or omission
of another human being, includes a range of offenses that involve either purposefully,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causing death. The term thus includes murder,
manslaughter, and negligent homicide, all generally classified as felonies. See BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 734 (6th ed. 1990).
47. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d 515 (Cal. 1967) (overturning conviction on
appeal for procedural error in case involving child suffering from intestinal obstruc-
tion which mother treated with enemas, compresses, and prayer); Craig v. State, 155
A.2d 684 (Md. 1959) (reversing parents' conviction of manslaughter, finding that prox-
inate cause of death was illness, not neglect).
48. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 432 (observing reversals for failure to show
proximate cause, erroneous jury instructions, failure of the state to file a timely bill
of particulars, and insufficiency of the evidence). This trend, if indeed it may be
called such, has not disappeared. See also State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990). In McKown, an 11-year-old boy died of diabetes complications after
withdrawal of insulin in favor of reliance on prayer. The conviction was overturned
on due process grounds, with two judges dissenting. However, in an intriguing con-
trary development, following the Minnesota Supreme Court's affirmation of the lower
tribunal in 1991, a jury awarded $5.2 million in damages to the boy's biological fa-
ther in a civil lawsuit. The jury said that the First Church of Christ, Scientist, the
boy's mother, Kathleen McKown and her husband, were directly responsible for the
death of the boy, Ian Lundman.
49. The first case of a homicide conviction upheld on appeal against a religion
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Before turning to consider some of these cases from the last
seven years or so, and before elaborating the resolution of the
first amendment question about free exercise of religion and the
modern legislative and judicial responses to this problem, it
may be helpful to glance at some of the religious groups whose
disagreement with the wider society regarding the efficacy or
propriety of medical treatment have brought them into conflict
with the laws.
IV. FAITH-HEALING SECTS AND LEGAL CONFLICT
Members of a fair number of religious faiths in the United
States have run up against criminal laws for failure to provide
medical treatment to their children. Sects which have called
upon members to refrain from certain or all types of medical
treatment for reasons of faith have included Jehovah's Witness-
es,5" The Faith Assembly,5 Christ Assembly,52 Church of
the First Born,53 Faith Tabernacle Church,' the Christian
Catholic Church of Chicago,55  and the well-known First
defense apparently came in 1985 with the case of Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497
A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The child essentially died of starvation where a tu-
mor obstructed the intestines. The parents, of Faith Tabernacle persuasion, did not
seek medical assistance but relied upon God to heal their child. Id. at 619. See also
Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989).
50. See supra note 16.
51. See Bergman v. Indiana, 486 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Dodes, supra
note 10, at 170 n.31 (citing CHLD, Spring 1986, at 3 (documenting the deaths of
three Ohio children whose parents are members of a sect of Faith Assembly)); Bill
Zlatos, Couple Recount Break With Faith Assembly, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL,
Mar. 3, 1986, at 2B; Richard Hughes, Infanticide in a Faith Healing Sect (1986) (un-
published paper, on file with the University of Richmond Law Review).
52. See Ivy B. Dodes, 'Suffer the Little Children . . . ' supra note 10, at 170 n.31
(citing State Should Stop Needless Deaths, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 27, 1986, at 9A
(documenting death of 13-month-old of pneumonia whose parents were members of
Christ Assembly)).
53. People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d 515 (Cal. 1967).
54. Members of the Faith Tabernacle Church believe life is ultimately in God's
hands, not the hands of medical practitioners. See Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497
A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (upholding parents' conviction for manslaughter where
parents used faith healing and child starved to death by obstruction to intestines due
to untreated tumor).
55. People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903) (affirming conviction of defendant
whose distrust of physicians and belief in prayer allowed 16-month-old to die of pneu-
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Church of Christ, Scientist.56 Members of all of these sects
have been accused of crimes based on the deaths of their
children after the parents refused medical treatment.
As I have already observed, the state usually does not hesi-
tate to intervene to order medical treatment while the endan-
gered child is alive; yet courts, juries, legislators, and some
commentators have been uncomfortable with cases involving
criminal charges against the parents after the child has died.
One cherished legacy of the First Amendment, perhaps, is that
casting judgment upon the sincere religious beliefs and practic-
es of others is not a well-respected enterprise in our pluralist
country. This is particularly true where casting such judgment
carries with it the ominous weight of the criminal justice sys-
tem. As the late United States Circuit Judge Irving Kaufmann
succinctly expressed, "[c]ourts temporal are not ideally suited to
resolve problems that originate in the spiritual realm.""7 Nev-
ertheless, the courts are repeatedly called upon to do just that,
particularly where such problems have important implications
for other people.
Until recently, the one religious group which probably
attracted the most attention of the courts over the years in the
United States was the Jehovah's Witnesses.58 Currently, how-
ever, the Witnesses pose perhaps the least case-by-case medical
and legal difficulty of all the groups mentioned above for sever-
al reasons.
First, Jehovah's Witnesses do not object categorically to all
medical treatment-only medical treatment that involves blood
transfusions. Consequently, the medical problems of Witnesses'
children are far more likely than those of the other groups to
come to the attention of doctors and of the state while there is
still time to intervefie effectively on behalf of the child.
monia).
56. State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
57. Irving Kaufmann, Life and Death Decisions: Medical Problems for Courts, THE
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1985, at E21.
58. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944), in which Justice
Rutledge's opinion for the Court begins, "[t]he case brings for review another episode
in the conflict between Jehovah's Witnesses and the state authority." Id.
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Second, the Jehovah's Witnesses' objection to blood transfu-
sions is now fairly well-known in the medical and legal commu-
nities. Therefore, routine procedures have been developed in
some jurisdictions to handle those situations in which a parent
refuses to consent to a needed blood transfusion for a child.
Moreover, given the Witnesses' long history in this regard, the
medical community is now more aware of acceptable medical
alternatives to blood transfusions, so that the religious beliefs
of Jehovah's Witness patients can be better accommodated. 9
Finally, advances in medical technology may eventually ren-
der blood transfusions unnecessary under most circumstances,
thus resolving the Jehovah's Witnesses' dilemma altogether.
Nonetheless, cases involving the Witnesses' refusal to accept
blood transfusions still arise, and involve adults as well as
children. Hence, it would be premature to assert that the prob-
lem has by any means gone away.60
Not all the children of faith-healing sects are as fortunate as
those of the Jehovah's Witnesses in this regard. For the clash
between religious belief, medical practice, and the law is great-
est and most wrenching where religious belief arguably pre-
cludes medical assistance altogether. The result is that state
authorities are less likely to learn of any imminent danger to
the child until it is too late. This dimension of the conflict is
illustrated by the First Church of Christ, Scientist, or the
59. See J. Lowell Dixon & M. Gene Smalley, Jehovah's Witnesses, The Surgicall-
Ethical Challenge, 246 JAMA 2471, 2471 (1981).
60. For example, in one recent federal case, the parents of a 15-year-old girl, An-
gelica Niebla, sued a California county for alleged violations of their civil rights un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for violations of procedural due process. The suit concerned
the county's issuance of emergency ex parte custody and blood transfusion orders for
Angelica through the juvenile court. The transfusions were effected, Angelica survived,
the parents sued, and the county in turn filed a medical neglect petition against
Angelica's parents for refusal to authorize the transfusions. The federal district court
dismissed the claims of Angelica and her parents, citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) and Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488
(W.D. Wash. 1967), affd 390 U.S. 598 (1968). The court stated that the "[firee exer-
cise of religion, bodily autonomy and parental rights yield before the compelling inter-
est the state has in protecting children from serious health problems." Niebla v.
County of San Diego, No. 90-56302, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15049 at *11 (9th Cir.
June 23, 1992).
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Christian Science Church, whose members, of late, have been
involved in a number of highly publicized faith-healing cases.
Presently there are about 2,200 Christian Science churches in
the United States.61 Relatively frequent conflicts between this
church and the state in its role as parens patriae occur because
Christian Scientists believe it is essentially immoral, or at least
a sign of imperfect atonement with God, to seek medical assis-
tance rather than relying upon trust in God to eliminate the
effects of, or escape the illusion of, illness and disease. In fact,
this article of faith is so central to Christian Science that mem-
bers can truthfully assert that without faith healing, there is no
Christian Science religion. A vigorous legal prohibition of all
faith-healing practices might destroy Christian Science
altogether.
As Church historian Karl Holl has explained, prayer treat-
ment in Christian Science is believed to be a "silent yielding of
self to God ... until His omnipresence and love are felt effec-
tively by man."62 The cure of disease through prayer is seen
as a necessary element in the redemption from the flesh and in
the overcoming of the mental illusions of pain and disease.63
Despite these clear foundational principles, however, the
reality of the situation, and hence the corresponding legal diffi-
culty, is slightly more subtle. On the one hand, officials of the
Christian Science Church claim that church members may
choose medical care without suffering any repercussion from the
church while, on the other hand, members who resort to medi-
cal treatment may feel as though they have failed in their
faith.64 This feeling of failure before God must be very strong,
for there have been at least seven cases since 1980 brought
against Christian Science parents whose children, at least ac-
cording to our best medical and legal point of view, died be-
61. Dodes, supra note 10 at 165 n.3 (citing Muriel Dobbin, When The State Takes
Aim at Faith Healing, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, Mar. 24, 1986, at 22).
62. Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986) (quoting 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPEDIA 562-64 (15th ed.
1984)).
63. Id.
64. See Dodes, supra note 10, at 165. n.3; Robinson, supra note 31, at 419.
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cause they chose faith-healing over conventional medical
treatment. 5
V. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION AND Parens Patriae
What, then, is the constitutional status of criminal cases in
which the parents are prosecuted for relying on faith-healing?
To what extent does such criminal prosecution violate the First
Amendment's free exercise clause? The short answer is that it
does not at all. Despite the claims of numerous defendants in
these cases, the free exercise of religion under the First Amend-
ment creates no insuperable constitutional barrier to criminal
prosecution, any more than it creates a barrier to timely state
intervention on behalf of an ailing child.
This may at first seem strange. After all, the Bill of Rights
begins with the 'powerful injunction, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."66 However, the United States Supreme
Court long ago distinguished between the religious beliefs of an
individual and actions pursuant to those beliefs; 7 and, more
recently, between legislation specifically directed against a giv-
en sect, and legislation that is neutral on its face and applies
to everyone.68 How can the court thus apparently run rough-
shod over the rights guaranteed in the first sentence of the
First Amendment?
There is perhaps no fully satisfying answer to this question,
except arguably, that the alternative is even less desirable.
Separation of church and state is a fine and comfortable sound-
ing phrase, upon which we rely heavily in our ideas about the
nature of our body politic. However, this simple phrase says
perhaps more than we can ever practically accomplish. While
citizens' judgments about what should be legally permissible
will always be formed in some degree by their religious convic-
tions, the state, as representative and protector of the
65. Robinson, supra note 31, at 413.
66. U. S. CONST. amend. I.
67. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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community at large, will always seek to regulate people's ac-
tions, some of which are inevitably religiously motivated. Per-
haps the best we can do is try to keep these two domains of
religion and state in balance, so that neither ultimately dictates
or usurps the function of the other.
The First Amendment is of course the fulcrum for this bal-
ancing act, and the courts are constantly moving this fulcrum
in order to maintain balance as they see it.
The Supreme Court began this balancing act between the
interests of free exercise and the interests of the state in 1878,
with a deceptively simple distinction between religious beliefs,
which were held not subject to state regulation, and religiously
motivated actions, which could be so regulated. The case was
Reynolds v. United States,69 in which the Court upheld a fed-
eral law prohibiting bigamy as applied to a Mormon, who
claimed bigamy was a religious duty. As Chief Justice Waite
reasoned: "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."M° He
elaborated, using language that indirectly implicates our cur-
rent subject:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a neces-
sary part of religious worship, would it be seriously con-
tended that the civil government under which he lived
could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife reli-
giously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the
funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the
power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her
belief into practice?71
Observing that polygamy has a long history of condemnation by
civil society, he concluded that: "to permit [it] would be to make
the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of
69. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
70. Id. at 164.
71. Id. at 166.
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the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself."
72
This deceptively simple distinction between religious belief
and religious practice became more subtle when the religious
practices in question were connected with another First Amend-
ment freedom, the freedom of speech. In Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,7 13 several Jehovah's Witnesses had been convicted for solic-
iting funds without a license while distributing religious materi-
als. The Court overturned the convictions on the ground that
the underlying statute, by allowing a licensing officer broad
discretion to decide who would be licensed to solicit and who
would not, violated both freedom of religion and freedom of
speech. This case is significant, here, because the Court would
later point out that only in cases where freedom of religion was
combined with another fundamental liberty would neutral re-
strictions be invalidated on grounds of freedom of religion.
The Court apparently developed a new test for adjudicating
free exercise claims in Sherbert v. Verner74 a case involving a
Seventh Day Adventist who was denied state unemployment
benefits after she was fired because she refused to work on
Saturdays. The State justified its action by claiming that denial
of unemployment benefits in such circumstances was necessary
to avoid fraudulent claims. The Supreme Court disagreed and
held that the state failed to sustain its burden of showing, first,
that its interest in discouraging fraud by this means was com-
pelling enough to justify the state-imposed burden upon the
person's religious practice; and second, even if discouraging
fraudulent claims were shown to be a compelling interest, it is
incumbent upon the State to show "that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights."75 Sherbert is especially significant because
of its suggestion that the court may require a "least restrictive
means" test in cases involving the free exercise of religion.
However, as we shall see, this requirement did not survive
outside a limited context.
72. Id. at 167.
73. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
74. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
75. Id. at 407.
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The Supreme Court further applied the principles set forth in
Sherbert in Wisconsin v. Yoder,7" a fascinating case involving
state interference in religious practice and parental control over
minors in the context of compulsory school education. Briefly
stated, the Court held, with only Justice Douglas in dissent,
that the State's interest in compulsory education did not out-
weigh the burden such a regulation would place on the free
exercise rights of Amish people. The Court maintained that
"[olnly those interests of the highest order and those not other-
wise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exer-
cise of religion."77 By releasing Amish children from the
requirement of school attendance beyond the eighth grade, the
Court went as far as it has ever been willing to go in the pro-
tection of religious beliefs from neutrally and generally applica-
ble statutes.
The old Sherbert standard was more or less reiterated in
1981 in the case of Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division. et al.7' The Court in this case
held that if the government is to place a substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct, the government must show that
it has a compelling state interest, and must protect that inter-
est by means narrowly tailored to advance it. 7"
All of this could arguably have some impact on state prosecu-
tions of parents who have relied on faith-healing. Some com-
mentators have suggested that under a least restrictive means
test, as in Sherbert, prosecutions after-the-fact do not pass
muster, because a state could find narrower, less restrictive,
means to protect children's interests by, for example, measures
directed at timely intervention."
In any event, the Supreme Court seemed to move the ful-
crum again in 1986. The compelling state interest test appeared
to have been abandoned, outside a limited context, in favor of a
different standard, involving the question of whether affirmative
76. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
77. Id. at 215.
78. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
79. Id. at 718.
80. See Christine Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability, 17 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 559, 581 (1990).
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compulsion of conduct offensive to the person's religion was in-
volved. The occasion for this apparent shift was Bowen v.
Roy," in which certain Native Americans objected to a
requirement that they obtain a social security number for their
child. The Native American plaintiffs believed as a matter of
religion that "control over one's life is essential to spiritual
purity" and that once a social security number was issued, their
daughter would be unable to control the state's use of it. 2 The
Court was unmoved however, and did not believe the intrusion
into the family's religious life significant enough to warrant
protection, partly because it was not specifically directed at
religious practice, and did not force the plaintiffs into any par-
ticular conduct that was religiously offensive. The Court stated
that "a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face is of a
wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compul-
sion . . . [of religious conduct].""
Finally, this "coercion" standard was strongly reaffirmed in
the Court's most famous recent free exercise case, Employment
Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith."
This case involved two members of the Native American
Church who were employed by a private drug rehabilitation
organization. When the organization discovered that these two
had ingested the drug peyote as part of a religious ceremony,
they were fired. The Native American Church members sued
when the Oregon Employment Division denied their applica-
tions for unemployment compensation because they had been
fired for work-related "misconduct."'
The Oregon Supreme Court found that the peyote prohibition,
as applied to members of the Native American Church, violated
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.86
However, the United States Supreme Court did not agree. On
the contrary, the Court held that the First Amendment "does
81. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
82. Id. at 696.
83. Id. at 704. The vote was 8:1, with Justice White the sole dissenter.
84. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
85. Id. at 872.
86. See Smith v. Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res., 763 P.2d 146 (Or.
1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).'" s '
In the Smith case, the Court narrowly circumscribed the
applicability of Sherbert v. Verner by pointing out that the
Sherbert test was never used to strike down any government
action outside the area of unemployment compensation."8
Thus, in other contexts, the compelling state interest test was
inapplicable.8 9 In addition, the Court pointed out that the only
cases in which it had previously found that the First Amend-
ment barred application of a "neutral, generally applicable law
to religiously motivated action" were those involving other con-
stitutional claims in addition to free exercise of religion."
Hence, in the face of a "neutral law of general applicability,"
religious freedom could only triumph if linked with another
fundamental right.9
Thus, under the rationale first announced in Reynolds in
1879 and later considerably modified, there have been a sur-
prisingly large number and variety of state interests that have
been held sufficient to warrant the infringement of free exercise
rights, provided that the law is not specifically directed against
religions, and provided further that it is not linked to other
fundamental rights. These overriding interests have included
preventing the evils of sex discrimination in employment, social
security fraud, mail fraud, race and sex discrimination in edu-
cation, communicable disease, polygamy, the use of snakes and
strychnine in the presence of children, and the use of illegal
drugs in religious ceremonies. Freedom of religion has also
yielded to the promotion of safety on the highways, and even to
the right to travel and to the protection of forest resources.
92
87. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3
(1982)).
88. See id. at 883.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 881.
91. Examples include free exercise plus free speech, as in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940), and free exercise plus the exercise of parental rights, as in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
92. See Dodes, supra note 10, at 179 n.79, for case citations for each of the catego-
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Moreover, in light of Prince v. Massachusetts, the argument
that, in the faith-healing context, free exercise is linked to
fundamental parental rights, and therefore, deserves the court's
protection, is also apparently unpersuasive.93
Thus, it seems clear that when an important governmental
interest is served thereby, the state can pass general laws
which incidentally infringe upon the rights of individuals to
practice their religion as they see fit,"' and that this state in-
tervention will be seen as especially justified where children's
lives are at stake.
Moreover, by intervening in these cases, the state is arguably
not so much interfering in parents' rights to instruct their chil-
dren in a chosen religion, as it is doing what it can to save the
child's life, so that, as the Supreme Court indicated in Prince v.
Massachusetts, when the time comes for the child to work out
his or her religious beliefs as a competent adult, the child is
alive to do soY Saving the child's life preserves religious free-
dom for the child in the future, even as it infringes on the
present rights of the parents.
In this sense, the state recognizes the individual's long-term
claim to life and to religious freedom and self-determination in
the future over the parent's immediate claim to exercise these
rights for the child in the present. As one theologian has stated
the issue, "by insisting on medical care, the state compels reli-
gious communities to become attentive to physical reality."6
As a constitutional matter, the state is thus free to do so. What
effect, if any, the Restoration of Religious Freedom Act of
1993"7 will have upon the issue is an open question. In any
event, that Act re-adopted the Sherbert v. Verner tests which
ries mentioned, except the reference to drugs, an issue which was recently resolved in
Smith. See supra notes 86-90.
93. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
94. On the other hand, a unanimous, albeit fractured, Supreme Court ruled in
1993 that city ordinances, such as Hialeah, Florida's barring ritual animal sacrifice,
violated the free exercise clause. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
95. See id. at 170.
96. Hughes, supra note 51.
97. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488.
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compel the government to prove a "compelling interest" and
"least restrictive means."
98
VI. STATE ACCOMMODATION OF FAITH-HEALING
In view of the fairly firm and well-settled general legal prin-
ciple that the state may intervene in the interests of minor
children, it may be surprising that the free exercise claim is so
often raised as a defense in the faith-healing cases, and should
so frequently cause difficulty for the courts; yet it does so, re-
peatedly. Why should this be?
Ironically, part of the nswer is that in many of the recent
cases, the free exercise argument has become plausible only
because of ambiguous state statutory exemptions from liability
for child neglect. It appears that many states intended to carve
out a religious exception to accommodate faith-healing, so that
under the standard child neglect statutes, parents who refuse to
seek needed medical treatment for their children due to sincere
religious beliefs need not fear prosecution. These exemptions
resulted from HEW regulations in- 1974, which basically re-
quired state exemptions for faith-healing as a condition on the
state's receipt of certain matching funds.99 Needless to say,
nearly every state in the country created the exemptions.' 0
The regulations, a result of Christian Science lobbying, were
later modified, but most of the state exemptions remain.'0 '
However, there are two reasons why these exemptions have not
worked.
First, not only does the Constitution not require such exemp-
tions, but in some cases the particular state accommodation
statutes are themselves unconstitutional in that they violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." 2
98. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
99. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (1988).
100. At least 47 states passed the exemptions. See Monopoli, supra note 34, at 320
n.5. One state, Oklahoma, has modified the exemption to require medical attention
"where permanent physical damage could result" to the child. Id. at 330 n.57.
101. See Child Abuse and Neglect and Prevention and Treatment, 45 C.F.R. § 1340
(1992).
102. See, e.g., Ohio v. Miskimeus, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. P1. 1984).
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Second, while the accommodation statute works fine in the
child neglect context before a child dies, the exemptions do not
necessarily apply in the context of a later charge of homicide.
Thus, faith-healing parents are assured on the one hand that
the state recognizes their practice and will not prosecute them
for child neglect; but on the other hand, if a child dies as a
result of reliance on faith-healing alone, the parents may be
prosecuted for homicide. This creates terrible confusion. Under
these accommodation statutes, a parent's status as a non-negli-
gent, innocent faith-healer is suddenly transformed to that of a
criminal the moment the child dies. 10 3 Thus, as one commen-
tator has aptly observed, it is permissible to rely on faith-heal-
ing, but the parents had better hope that God is listening, or
they may be prosecuted for homicide!'0 4
Ohio v. Miskimens °5 considers such a statute. The chal-
lenged Ohio statute contained the following accommodation
clause:
It is not a violation of a duty of care, protection, or support
under this division when the parent, guardian, custodian, or
person having custody or control of a child treats the physi-
cal or mental illness or defect of such child by spiritual
means through prayer alone, in accordance with the tenets
of a recognized religious body.106
The Ohio court found the statute impossible to apply in a con-
stitutional manner.
[The statute] hopelessly involves the state in the determina-
tion of questions which should not be the subject of govern-
mental inquisition ... such as what is a "recognized reli-
gious body," by whom must it be "recognized," for how long
must it have been "recognized," what are its tenets, did the
accused act in accordance with those tenets, what are "spir-
itual means," and what is the effect of combining some
prayer with some treatment or medicine. 1 7
103. See Sheiderer, supra note 32, at 1443.
104. Id. at 1445.
105. 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. P1. 1984).
106. Id. at 933.
107. Id. at 934.
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Thus, far from being constitutionally required, Ohio's statutory
exemption for faith-healing was unconstitutional. Similarly, al-
though many of the accommodation statutes which currently
exist in a majority of the states are worded differently than the
Ohio statute,0 8 they nonetheless raise thorny issues of consti-
tutionality. A number of commentators have therefore under-
standably called for the modification or outright repeal of these
exemptions."0 9 Such repeal would 'send the unambiguous mes-
sage that, in the context of a medical emergency, prayer and
faith-healing efforts, however laudable, caring and arguably
efficacious they may be, are acceptable to the state only if a
child's life or safety is also protected by the provision of any
needed medical treatment.
Of course, the repeal of the statutory exemptions would not
solve all of the problems associated with this issue. Nor is it
the single best solution that can be had. However, if the state
is determined to protect children, as it should be, it makes no
sense to persist in presenting faith-healing parents with a false
appearance of safety by granting an exemption with one hand,
only to take it away with the other. Moreover, by clearly set-
ting forth the legal rights and duties of everyone involved, the
state will be doing everything it knows how to protect the lives
of its citizens. In the absence of Lady Rothschild or the angel of
the Lord, it may be the best we can do for both Abraham and
Isaac, in this three-way collision between faith, medicine, and
the law.
VII. SoME RECENT CASES
Having reviewed the constitutional and statutory context of
faith-healing and criminal prosecutions where tragedy has en-
sued, it may be useful to examine a few of the recent cases
that have arisen. These examples will graphically illustrate the
inadequacy of the statutory exemptions mentioned above, and
the perhaps avoidable tragedy that can result.
108. See Monopoli, supra note 34, at 320 n.5.
109. See Scheiderer, supra note 32, at 1445.
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The first instance of record in the United States in which an
appellate court upheld a guilty verdict for homicide in connec-
tion with the failed faith-healing of a child was the Pennsylva-
nia case of Commonwealth v. Barnhart". in 1985. Justin
Barnhart, a two-year-old, died as a result of a kidney tumor,
which essentially caused his starvation, by using up nourish-
ment and crowding out Justin's intestines. The illness contin-
ued over a period of several months and was treated only by
prayer. Following an autopsy, physicians testified that, had the
problem been brought to the attention of a doctor before the
cancer had metastasized and spread to his lungs, the child
would have had an eighty-five to ninety-five percent chance of
survival, and even if discovered after it metastasized, Justin
would have had a fifty percent chance of survival. While this
raises the question of whether the failure to seek medical help
was, beyond a reasonable doubt, the cause of death, the jury at
the trial level resolved this question in the affirmative.
On appeal, the appellate court had little difficulty with this
aspect of the case. Nor did the appellate court spend inordinate
time considering whether Justin's parents were on notice of the
dangers of his condition. However, as the court succinctly stat-
ed: "What does remain is troublesome. Our decision today di-
rectly penalizes appellants exercise of their religious beliefs.
Appellants ask how we can hold them criminally liable for
putting their faith in God? No easy answer attends.""'
The court resolved this uncomfortable problem by resorting to
Prince v. Massachusetts."1
2
We recognize that our decision today directly penalizes
appellants in the practice of their religion. We emphasize
that the liability attaches not to appellants' decision for
themselves but rather to their decision effectively to forfeit
their child's life .... Admittedly, the distinction is not a
happy one. An integral part of family life is the transmis-
sion of values from one generation to the next. In the case
at bar, the values include a set of religious beliefs. Sitting
110. 497 AK2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
111. Id. at 621.
112. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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as a court of law, we abjure even the suggestion that, by
our decision today, we are passing on the contents of those
beliefs .... Now, this case is really not a. question. of
Christian faith or the efficacy of prayer. It is whether the
parents of Justin failed to seek medical assistance for a
seriously ill child and that failure caused his death."3
Significantly, the Barnhart court gave short shrift to the reli-
gious accommodation portion of the Pennsylvania Child Protec-
tive Services Law." 4 In regard to the defendant's reliance on
this provision, the Pennsylvania court stated simply, "failure to
report, however, is not at issue here.""5 The U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the case in 1988.16
One other recent case that has generated considerable contro-
versy involving Christian Science is the case of Commonwealth
v. Twitchell," one that underscores the tragedy and suffering
to children that can attend a parent's choice of faith-healing.
The case is also useful in that it illustrates the mechanics of
the Christian Science practice of faith-healing, and in that the
Christian Science Church took up the cause of the Twitchell's
legal defense.
Robyn Twitchell was a six-month-old boy who fell sick on
April 3, 1986. Over the course of the next five days, Robyn
showed continuing signs of illness, including screaming, vomit-
ing, and the appearance of being in severe pain."' Robyn's
mother called a Christian Science practitioner and a Christian
Science church official on the second day of his illness."9 On
the third day the practitioner went to pray with the child, who
had continued vomiting. After the practitioner left, Robyn's
mother called her back, to report that Robyn was still vomiting.
113. Barnhart, 497 A.2d at 624-25.
114. 11 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §§ 2201-24 (Supp. 1984). That accommodation provision
exempted from reporting cases in which the child in question "is in good faith being
furnished treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the
tenet and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination .... " Id.
115. Barnhart, 497 A.2d at 628.
116. 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
117. 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993).
118. Monopoli, supra note 34, at 323-24. See Robinson, supra note 31, at 114.
119. Monopoli, supra note 34, at 323.
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It was decided that they would continue to pray for the
child.12
0
On the evening of the fourth day, the Christian Science nurse
suggested bland foods and liquid, which had no effect. On the
fifth day, Robyn's vomiting had a strange smell and his mother
became alarmed. When she could not reach the Christian Sci-
ence practitioner on the phone, she called a church official,
Nathan Talbot, who advised her to keep trying to reach the
practitioner, which she finally did.12' On this, the fifth day of
the child's illness, the Christian Science practitioner returned to
the home to pray; Robyn Twitchell went into spasms, and died
about an hour later of a bowel obstruction. 122
At no time during the course of this increasingly serious
illness did Robyn's parents seek medical attention. Only after
Robyn had apparently died, and his father, David Twitchell,
had called a funeral home, was an ambulance contacted.'" By
then, it was too late. In the opinion of the medical examiner
who performed the autopsy, Robyn could have been resuscitated
up to one-half hour after cardiac arrest if medical assistance
had been obtained within that time. 24 Moreover, according to
the physician on call at the time of Robyn's death, the bowel
obstruction itself could have been corrected by surgery with an
expectation of success that approached one hundred per-
cent.
125
Thus, in the Twitchell case, the legal community was faced
with the apparently easily preventable death of a child that
was caused by a religious practice lying at the heart of a
church's beliefs. The Massachusetts judge who prepared the
inquest report on Robyn Twitchell's death, nevertheless, found
that the facts warranted prosecution for involuntary man-
120. Id. at 323-24.
121. Id. at 324 (citing Justice's Report on Inquest Relating to the Death of Robyn
Twitchell, Commonwealth of Massachusetts District Court Department, Suffolk Coun-
ty, West Roxbury Division, Inquest No. 1. of 1986, at 6, [hereinafter Just. Rep. on
Inquest]).
122. Monpoli, supra note 34, at 323.
123. Id at 324 (citing Just. Rep. on Inquest, at 7).
124. Id. at 325 (citing Just. Rep. on Inquest, at 7-8).
125. Monopoli, supra 34, at 324-25.
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slaughter. 6 Still, his conclusion in this regard was tempered
not so much by the religious concerns involved, but by the
unsatisfactory state of the applicable law. He acknowledged
that in light of the Massachusetts child neglect statute's exemp-
tion for faith-healing, a religious family could easily be misled
into thinking that its faith-healing beliefs "have won public
endorsement."' 27 The judge thas indicated that while the facts
warranted prosecution, the statutory law was ambiguous and
should be changed.
Shortly thereafter, Robyn's parents were tried and convicted
of involuntary manslaughter, despite defense arguments regard-
ing freedom of religion and the statutory exemption for parents
who rely on faith-healing. However, in light of the nature of the
case, no prison sentence was imposed. The Twitchells were
sentenced to ten years' probation, including regular medical.
attention for the remaining children.28 But on August 11,
1993, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturned
their conviction 6:1 on a narrow point of law.2 9 The justices
ruled that the Twitchells "reasonably believed that they could
rely on spiritual treatment without fear of criminal prosecu-
tion"130 based on a church publication the father had read.
That argument, the court held, should have been presented to
the jury.'31 However, the court did not rule out all prosecu-
tions of parents who rely on spiritual healings; instead, parents
can be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter if they are
found to be "wanton and reckless" in their care of a child. 32
Many of the tragic features and legal ambiguities arising in
the Twitchell case have been repeated elsewhere. The case of
Walker v. Superior Court3 3 in 1988 provides another example,
not only of the jolting human tragedy that attends these cases,
but also of the logical perversity of the exception for faith-heal-
126. Id. at 325.
127. Id.
128. Monopoli, supra note 34, at 325 & n.28 (citing Christian Scientists Are Given
Probation for Death of Child, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1990, S1 (Nat'l Desk), at 8, col. 5).
129. 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993).
130. Id. at 613.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 612.
133. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
19931
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ers that so many states have included in their child neglect
statutes. Walker also shows to some extent the legal impact of
the efforts of the Christian Science Church to maintain legal
protection for members whose faith-healing efforts have gone
awry.
Shauntay Walker fell ill on February 17, 1984, with what ap-
peared to be an ordinary flu." 4 Her mother, Laurie Walker,
was a Christian Scientist, and she prayed for the child. Howev-
er, after four days, Shauntay developed a peculiar stiff neck,
and so her mother called a Christian Science practitioner. 5
As in the Twitchell case, the practitioner also prayed for the
child, and visited her on two occasions. After a week, a
Christian Science nurse was engaged. She visited the home on
February 27, and twice in early March, including the day before
Shauntay's death."6 "Shauntay nevertheless lost weight, grew
disoriented and irritable during the last week of her illness,
and died on March 9 of acute purulent meningitis after a peri-
od of heavy and irregular breathing. During the seventeen days
she lay ill, the child received no medical treatment."" 7
The State of California charged Shauntay's mother with in-
voluntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment, alleg-
ing that the mother's criminal negligence was the cause of
Shauntay's death.3 ' Once again however, as we saw in the
Twitchell case, the defendant was able to raise the argument
that the prosecution violated her First Amendment rights'39
and that her conduct was, in any event, specifically protected
by law because of the religious faith-healing exemption under
the applicable child endangerment statute. 4 ' She further ar-
gued that the statutes under which she had been charged did
not provide fair notice that her conduct was a crime, and
moved to dismiss the prosecution. The trial court denied the




138. Id. at 855.
* 139. Id. at 855-56.
140. Id. at 856.
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motion14 and she appealed to the Court of Appeals. The mo-
tion was summarily denied and she appealed a second time.
The issues of the effect of the statutory exemption for faith-
healing, the extent of freedom of religion, and of fair notice as
to the criminality of faith-healing which has failed, all came
before the California Supreme Court. 42
Laurie Walker's defense in the case, and on appeal to the
California Supreme Court, was supplemented by an amicus
curiae brief by the Christian Science Church. This is fitting,
because the statutory ambiguities, to which we have already
referred, resulted largely from a 1976 amendment to Cali-
fornia's child endangerment statute, which was accomplished
due to the lobbying efforts of the church."'4 The statute, origi-
nally enacted in 1872 currently reads in pertinent part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful
excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medi-
cal attendance, or other remedial care for his or her child,
he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor . 145
This is fairly straightforward. In 1976, lobbyists for the
Christian Science Church succeeded in persuading the Califor-
nia legislature to enact the following exception to the statute:
If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual
means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets
and practices of a recognized church or religious denomina-
tion, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treat-






145. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
146. Id. See Walker, 763 P.2d at 856 & n.3.
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We have already seen a similar statute in Ohio declared uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment in the case of State v. Miskimins. 47 While
the California court did not take this approach, Justice Mosk,
in a separate concurrence to his own majority opinion, urged
that this approach be followed and lamented that a majority of
his fellow Justices were, as yet, unwilling to go down the con-
stitutionality road with him.148
In any event, the majority of the California Supreme Court
found, astonishingly, that the child endangerment statute's
exception for faith-healing was not only ineffective to prevent
Laurie Walker's prosecution for involuntary manslaughter un-
der a different statute, but it was also ineffective to prevent her
prosecution for child endangerment itself. 49 Relying on legis-
lative history, precedent, painstaking grammatical analysis, and
rules of statutory interpretation, the majority concluded that
the faith-healing exception under section 270 of the California
Penal Code was intended not to exempt faith-healing parents
like Laurie Walker from liability for child-endangerment. Rath-
er, the majority found that the exception was intended to se-
cure financial support for the child and to "protect the public
from the burden of supporting a child who has a parent able to
support him."'o Thus, according to the court, the faith-heal-
ing exception protects the state from the costs associated with
taking custody of children merely because their parents practice
faith-healing. State custody will not be assumed on that basis
alone.'' However, this does not mean that parents can, with
impunity, allow their children to suffer and die for lack of med-
ical treatment. Thus, the court concluded:
The legislative design appears consistent: prayer treatment
will be accommodated as an acceptable means of attending
to the needs of a child not insofar as serious physical harm
or illness is not at risk[!] When a child's life is placed in
147. 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Com. P1. 1984).
148. Walker, 763 P.2d at 873 (Mosk, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 860.
150. Id. at 859-60 (quoting People v. Sorense, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968)).
151. Id. at 860.
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danger, we discern no intent to shield parents from the
chastening prospect of felony liability.
15 2
This counter intuitive conclusion, which was supported by the
court's painstaking statutory analysis, but was not persuasive
enough to convince all the justices, 53 is matched in peculiari-
ty by the court's analysis of Laurie Walker's negligence liability.
In a reprise of the problems we saw in the old English cases,
the court applied an objective "reasonable man" standard to
Laurie Walker's religious beliefs." Under such a standard, a
jury may find guilt if a hypothetical "reasonable man," or ordi-
narily prudent and careful person, determines that the conduct
in question was incompatible with a proper regard for human
life, and was therefore culpably reckless. Under such an objec-
tive standard, Laurie Walker could be found guilty. We might
easily conclude that under California law, the hypothetical
"reasonable man" is not a Christian Scientist. Obviously, such
an analysis comes perilously close to a direct legal punishment
for a religious belief. The clash between the religious and the
legal evaluation of this situation could not be more stark.
The Walker court, as so many other courts since 1985 have
begun to do, relied on Prince v. Massachusetts,'15  to uphold
the legality of Laurie Walker's prosecution, concluding that
"parents have no right to free exercise of religion at the price of
a child's life."'56 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in
1988.157
VIII. CONCLUSION
What should the state's response be in the face of these re-
peated tragedies? We might answer the question by process of
elimination. A blanket prohibition of faith-healing is patently
152. 763 P.2d at 866.
153. Justice Broussard concurred in part and dissented in part, observing that the
child-endangerment exception does not bar a charge of manslaughter, but certainly
applies to a charge of child-endangerment. Id. at 878-81.
154. Id. at 868.
155. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
156. Walker, 763 P.2d at 870.
157. 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
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out of the question. Aside from the perhaps salutary effects of
faith-healing practice in many instances not discussed here,
such a prohibition would fly in the face of the First Amend-
ment's free exercise component as an act specifically directed at
suppressing a religious belief.
At the same time, we have seen that the religious accommo-
dation statutes built in to many states' child neglect laws and
policies are plainly counterproductive, for they promise a protec-
tion from liability that in practice neither protects nor accom-
modates anyone in the final analysis. Nor can the state sit idly
by and allow children in its community to die, when this result
can so easily, albeit controversially, be prevented. Finally, state
criminal prosecution of the parents is not the optimal solution.
While such prosecution sends a clear constitutionally permissi-
ble message in light of Prince v. Massachusetts'58  and
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources
v. Smith,"9 we are still left with the uncomfortable conclusion
addressed by the Pennsylvania Court in Barnhart. "Appellants
ask how we can hold them criminally liable for putting their
faith in God? No easy answer attends."6 °
While prosecutions may be a necessary component of any
such solution, it may be argued with some coherence that few
people who believe so strongly in faith-healing as to lose a child
will be deterred by the prospect of a few year's probation, as is
usually the sentence. Whether the imposition of stiffer sentenc-
es would prove to be viable, is a contentious question.
In the end, it seems, the best balance obtainable would be to
maximize the occurrence of those situations where some local
substitute for the angel of the Lord could intervene in a timely
fashion. A general and neutrally applicable reporting require-
ment regarding serious child illness could perhaps be crafted
best to serve this purpose. In fact, at least two states16' have
now amended their child neglect statutes to require timely
158. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
160. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616, 621 (Pa. 1985).
161. See FLA. STAT. CH. 415.503(9)(f)(1) (1989); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(c) (Supp.
1989).
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reporting of serious child illnesses in cases where the religious
exemption may be invoked, so that the state can act to transfer
legal custody in a timely manner. For in the end, as Lady
Rothschild observed, "the responsibility to protect the life of the
child is ours."'62
162. Court Edict, supra note 1.
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